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EUTHANASIA IN AUSTRALASIA
KM. Sharma*
I. INTRODUCTION
Against all the injuries of life I have the refuge of death. If I can
choose between a death of torture and one that is simple and easy,
why should I not select the latter? As I choose the ship in which I
sail and the house which I shall inhabit, so I will choose the death
by which I leave life. In no matter more than in death should we
act according to our desire. . . . [W]hy should I endure the ago-
nies of disease . . .when I can emancipate myself from all my
torments?'
Thus asked the Roman philosopher, Lucius Seneca (4 B.C. - A.D. 65), and
one cannot help but agree with his sentiments. However, for modem twenti-
eth century man in Australia, there is no such refuge. He cannot end his life
when it becomes a burden to himself and to others because euthanasia is not
legal in this country. For him the choice of death over the vicissitudes of life
is not in any sense a real alternative.
Vex not his ghost: 01 let him pass; he hates him
That would upon the rack of this tough world
Stretch him out longer.
William Shakespeare, King Lear, Act V, scene 3, lines 314-16. Why this
should be so is traceable to long-standing ecclesiastical and legal prohibitions
against both suicide and murder. The attitude of the law is to recognize the
inviolability of the human body. Hence, euthanasia, the "mercy-motivated
killing" or the "merciful extinction of life" is rejected in most religions; in
Hinduism, and in traditional Judaeo-Christian belief, chiefly because of the
Sixth Commandment: Thou shalt not kill.
However, in a century where the average life expectancy has reached and
passed seventy years (compared with forty-seven years in 1900) and where
improved hygiene, nutrition and medicine have helped people escape the
deadly contagions of the past, survivors are handed over in their latter years
to long and lingering deaths. As one author puts it, "for every easily treated
• B.A., M.A., LL.B. LL.M. (Rajasthan), LL.M., S.J.D. (Harvard); Faculty of Law,
University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia.
1. 1 W. LECKY, HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MORALS FROM AUGUSTUS TO
CHARLEMAGNE 108 (3d. ed. 1898).
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disease of yesterday there has appeared a multitude of other diseases whose
damage is chronic and not wholly reversible. Standing out among these are
cancer and the degenerative diseases associated with aging and the wear and
tear of life." 2
Many of these sufferers would choose to end their lives if they could, pre-
ferring a gentle death to a long drawn-out and painful dying. Indeed, com-
munity surveys in Australia indicate that more than two-thirds of the
general public support euthanasia and that this support is growing each
year. However, at present in Australia, prohibitions mean the individual
does not have a choice, with voluntary euthanasia (or the ending of life at his
own request) being unavailable.
Euthanasia is clearly relevant not only to the elderly but to society at
large. There are three relatively distinct classes of individuals to whom eu-
thanasia becomes relevant:
First, individuals suffering from painful and terminal illness
(such as cancer and multiple sclerosis), who, by definition, have at
best months, weeks or perhaps only days to live.
Second, individuals diagnosed as irreversibly defective or degen-
erate, including the chronically mentally ill, the retarded, those
with gross physical defects, and the vegetived aged. Of these indi-
viduals, some have been rendered permanently paralyzed, debili-
tated or comatose by either the ravages of their progressive illness
or by accident and their life is often senselessly prolonged by heroic
measures. They have no realistic hope of regaining cognitive
function.
Third, newly-born and young children who suffer from gross
mental-neurological--or physical deformities, or, perhaps, from a
combination of both. The multiple, severe and disabling congenital
malformations are such that, notwithstanding its longevity, the
child will be unable to care for its most elemental needs, totally
dependent on others for survival.4
2. Furlow, Tyranny of Technology: A Physician's Look at Euthanasia, 24 THE HUMAN-
iST 6 (1974).
3. Lander, Some Medical Aspects of Euthanasia, 141 MED. J. AusT.. 173, 177 n.18
(1984). See also Tiver, Voluntary Euthanasia, 12 AUSTL. NURSES J. 49 (1982); Cohen, The
Right to Live and the Right to Die, 141 MED. J. AusTL. 60 (1984).
4. See generally Smith, Life and Death Decisions in the Nursery: Standards and Proce-
dures for Withholding Lifesaving Treatment from Infants, 27 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 1125 (1982);
Longino, Withholding Treatment From Defective Newborns. Who Decides, and on What Crite-
ria?, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 377 (1983); Note, Withholding Treatment from Defective Infants:
"Infant Doe" Postmortem, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 224 (1983); Comment, Withholding Life-
saving Treatment From Defective Newborns. An Equal Protection Analysis, 29 ST. Louis U. L.
J. 853 (1985); Human Rights Commission, Australia, Legal and Ethical Aspects of the Man-
agement of Newborns with Severe Disabilities (Occasional Paper No. 10, Aug. 1985).
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II. THE PRESENT LAW IN AUSTRALASIA
A. Euthanasia at Common Law: Homicide?
Against the backdrop of the English common law which has provided the
foundation for criminal law in Australia, let us look a little more closely at
the law in Australia as it relates to voluntary euthanasia. It is clear at com-
mon law that euthanasia is homicide. The fact that the administering physi-
cian might be acting out of compassion and from the highest of motives does
not change the characterization of the offense as murder. The requisite mens
rea or mental element of the crime-that of an intention to kill-would be
present, as would the actus reus, the performance of the criminal act. Mo-
tive is not taken into account, 5 nor is it relevant that the patient requested
his own death,6 or that death from natural causes may have been imminent.
The law makes no distinction between a vicious killer and the kindly doc-
tor if there is an intention to kill. If the physician chooses to make available
to the patient the means of ending his own life, then he could be guilty under
the law of aiding and abetting a suicide or attempted suicide.
It is necessary to distinguish voluntary euthanasia from other similar, but
not necessarily related, situations. Voluntary euthanasia occurs when a doc-
tor, or some other person, and the patient-victim discuss the circumstances
and the latter requests death. Involuntary euthanasia is the taking of life of
another without his consent, as in the case of a severely retarded newborn or
unconscious person who is not expected to regain consciousness and has not
previously rendered consent. Each type may be accomplished by either
"passive, or "active" procedures.
The primary legal problem concerning euthanasia, voluntary or not, is
that it is a euphemism for murder in that both are the product of wilful,
deliberate, and premeditated acts or omissions. Thus, a doctor who adminis-
ters a requested but lethal drug may be charged with murder regardless of
motives of mercy, and the patient's consent will not exonerate him. The
common law philosophy that life is inalienable precludes any individual
from giving permission for his own extinction. But, unlike a murderer, a
mercy-killer's motive is not malice or vengence; rather, he is motivated by
the very compassionate human desire to end painlessly the subject's unbear-
5. However, some European criminal law systems (e.g., Germany and Switzerland) con-
sider motive a crucial factor in determining culpability of an accused. Silving, Euthanasia: A
Study in Comparative Law, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 350, 351 (1953). See also Caughey, The Ger-
man Euthanasia Programme, 98 N.Z. MED. J. 555 (1985).
6. In some countries consent to suicide does operate to mitigate the offense from murder
to a lesser crime. For example, the INDIAN PENAL CODE § 300, exception 5 (1860) provides
that consent of a victim over the age of eighteen to suicide vitiates the murder charge, thus
resulting in reduced punishment.
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able and continued suffering. The law, however, takes no cognizance of this
distinction.
However, despite the strictness of the common law in punishing the taking
of human life, a physician in some cases can aid a patient's desire for death
by administering "passive" euthanasia. This involves no affirmative action
such as administering drugs but rather the withdrawing or termination of
treatment to patients. As far as this kind of euthanasia by inaction or omis-
sion is concerned, there is little or no direct authority on how far the law
expects the physician's duty of care to his patient to go in preserving his life.
The medical profession obviously appreciates the difference between avoid-
ing death and prolonging life. It has been conceded by many ecclesiastics
that a doctor need not use artificial and "extraordinary" means to preserve
life indefinitely, but only adopt "ordinary" means when a patient is in great
pain and in the process of dying. Thus, doctors may passively allow a pa-
tient to die, but not actively end his life.7
The legality of this issue does not seem to have been squarely decided by
the courts. However, it is arguable that, since a physician's legal duty is
principally contractual and predicated upon the patient's consent, nonfea-
sance, where there is no basis for presumptive consent, should go unpun-
ished even though active euthanasia remains punishable. But it would seem
lawful today in England, and possibly in Australia, to give a patient such a
large quantity of drugs that it will relieve pain but at the same time hasten
death.
7. For example, Pope Pius XII, in a 1957 "allocutio" (address), stated that if the use of a
respirator goes "beyond the ordinary means to which one is bound, it cannot be held that there
is an obligaiton to use them or... to give the doctor permission to use them.... There is not
involved here a case of direct disposal of life of the patient; nor of euthanasia in any way; this
would never be licit. Even when it causes the arrest of circulation, the interruption of attempts
at resuscitation is never more than an indirect cause of the cessation of life." Eichner v. Dil-
lon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 439 n.3, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 526 n.3 (1980) (quoting The Prolongation of
Life, Address of Pope Pius XII to an International Congress of Anesthesiologists, Nov. 24,
1957 A.A.S. XXXXXIX (1957)), modified sub nom., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d
64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S 858 (1981). For a discussion of the distinction
between active and passive complicity in the death of another, see Rachels, Active and Passive
Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 78 (1975); Abrams, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 54
PHIL. 257 (1978); Dinello, On Killing and Letting Die, 21 ANALYSIS 83 (1970). See also
Gerber, 56 AUSTL. L.J. 139 (1982) (discussing In re B. (A Minor), [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421
(C.A.), and R. v. Arthur (1981, unreported), on the question of allowing mongoloid infants to
die); Gerber & Vasta, 58 AUSTL. L. J. 291 (1984) (discussing Barber v. Superior Court, 147
Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983), on the removal of respirators and other life-
sustaining machines, including the administration of nourishment through intravenous tubes,
in the context of Australian law); Kuhse, A Modern Myth-That Letting Die Is Not the Inten-
tional Causation of Death: Some Reflections of the Trial and Acquittal of Dr. Leonard Arthur,
I J. APPLIED PHIL. 21 (1984).
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The British case of R. v. Instan' suggests that in the United Kingdom,
homicide can be committed by "culpable omission." In that case a niece was
found guilty of manslaughter in the killing of her aunt, by failing to provide
her with food and drink, knowing full well that no one else would provide it
in her place. On the other hand, a court in Sweden ruled in 1968 that a
physician was not criminally liable for having shortened a patient's life by
cessation of life-prolonging treatment. 9
Apparently there has been no test case in this area in Australia although
passive euthanasia is a common occurrence and is practiced by doctors with-
out legal regulation.'0 Death is induced, for example, by withdrawing life-
prolonging equipment where recovery seems impossible or by the nonuse of
drugs to cure infections or other problems. In these cases the patient dies of
"natural causes" and difficulties of proof means that the physician escapes
prosecution unless he can be charged with neglect."
B. Voluntary Euthanasia: Suicide?
Because voluntary euthanasia is analogous to assisted suicide (often
treated more leniently than homicide), the legal principles relating to princi-
pal and accessory, and aiding and abetting, are significant. Generally, there
was no prosecution for attempted suicide, even when it was once considered
8. 17 Cox C.C. 602 (1893).
9. Cantor, Law and the Termination of an Incompetent Patient's Life-Preserving Care, in
THE DILEMMAS OF EUTHANASIA 75 (J. Behnke & S. Bok eds. 1975); Cantor, A Patient's
Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of
Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228 (1973).
10. According to a recent Monash University survey 90% of the obstetricians and 76% of
paediatricians had indulged in passive euthanasia at least once, and most paediatricians em-
phasized that changes were needed in the law relating to the treatment of severely handicapped
infants. Singer et al., The Treatment of Newborn Infants with Major Handicaps.- A Survey of
Obstetricians and Paediatricians in Victoria, 2 MED. J. AUSTL. 274 (1983). See generally H.
KUHSE & P. SINGER, SHOULD THE BABY LIVE?-THE PROBLEMS OF HANDICAPPED IN-
FANTS (1985).
11. A decision to withhold treatment from children would subject doctors-as well as the
parents-to criminal liability. See, e.g., Fost & Robertson, Passive Euthanasia of Defective
Newborn Infants: Legal Considerations, 88 J. PEDIAT. 883, 884-86 (1976); Chabon, You May
Face a Nightmare in the Newborn Nursery, 7 LEGAL Asp. MED. PRAC. 43, 45 (1979). How-
ever, in a highly publicised English case, a doctor (Dr. Leonard Arthur), who had withheld
treatment and food from a mongoloid infant, was found not guilty of attempted murder, even
though the infant died within three days. Brahams, Acquittal of Paediatrician Charged After
Death of Infant With Down's Syndrome, 2 LANCET 1101 (Nov. 14, 1981). But, it should be
noted that this case did not resolve the legal issues involved as the doctor's acquittal was
merely based on other peripheral issues and the facts of the case. Gerber, 56 AUSTL. L.J. 139,
141 (1982); Dr. Leonard Arthur: His Trial and Its Implications, 283 BRIT. MED. J. 1340
(1981). See C. BERNARD, GOOD LIFE/GOOD DEATH: A DOCTOR'S CASE FOR EUTHANASIA
AND SUICIDE 52 (1980); SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA (S. Wallace & A. Eser eds. 1981).
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an offense under English common law.' 2 But, the law treats the assistance of
another in suicide as a crime, regardless of the abettor's motive or the vic-
tim's request.
There are three divergent approaches at common law concerning the abet-
tor's liability. First, the accessory is viewed as a principal in the suicide.
Second, the accessory enjoys immunity where the principal's act is not a
crime. And, third, the accessory is guilty of an independent crime.
Obviously, concerning euthanasia, the relevant category is that of acces-
sory before the fact. Where suicide is no longer a crime, incitement or abet-
ment of suicide is a statutory misdemeanor. However, the accessory before
the fact is still liable as a principal offender.
Mention must be made of the common law recognition of an individual's
right to self-determination over his own body. The rendering of any noncon-
sensual medical treatment constitutes an assault and battery. Yet, as an ex-
ception, in an emergency, where the patient is incapable of consent, the law
recognizes the right of a physician to render medical aid on an implied-con-
sent basis. However, the concept of a right to control one's body does not
extend to freedom to end one's life (suicide), to end one's life with the assist-
ance of another (assisted suicide-euthanasia), or to end the life of another
individual who is dependent on, or indistinguishable from, one's own body
(abortion, euthanasia).
1. South Australia
For the act of suicide itself, South Australia has enacted provisions, like
Victoria and New Zealand, similar to the United Kingdom Suicide Act,
1961. Under section 13a of the Criminal Law Consolidation Amendment
Act, 1982, suicide and attempted suicide are no longer criminal offenses.' 3
Similarly, aiding or assisting a suicide is clearly, as with deliberate homicide,
wrong, since intention is the key factor. Thus, it is an offense to aid and abet
a person to commit suicide. 4
With the enactment of the Natural Death Act, 1983, South Australia has
gone further than other Australian jurisdictions with regard to euthanasia.
Section 4 of the act gives effect to a "living will," namely, a written docu-
ment in a prescribed form in which a person states that in the event of him/
her suffering a terminal illness he/she will not be subjected to extraordinary
medical measures in an artificial prolongation of the dying process, a doctor
12. See generally Parry-Jones, Criminal Law and Complicity in Suicide and Attempted
Suicide, 13 MED., SCI. & L. 110 (1973).
13. P. BRETr & L. WALLER, CRIMINAL LAW-TEXT AND CASES 123 (5th ed. 1983).
14. Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act, 1982, § 13a(10) (S. Austl.).
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being under a duty to act in accordance with such a declaration. This provi-
,sion has the effect of legalizing a form of passive euthanasia."5
2. England, Victoria, New South Wales and New Zealand
In all these four jurisdictions, suicide, which was self-murder at common
law, and attempted suicide, are no longer offenses, and they have virtually
identical statutory provisions. 16
Likewise in all Australian jurisdictions, except Victoria, the finding offelo
de se (felon against himself, one who commits suicide) has been abolished
under the respective coroners acts. 7 In Victoria the situation is slightly dif-
ferent, with section 17 limiting the effects of the finding of felo de se.'8
Although suicide is no longer a crime in itself, it remains an offense for
any person to aid, abet, counsel or procure the suicide of another.'9 In this
respect, a recent English decision, Attorney-General v. Able,2" needs to be
noted. The question at issue was whether the supplying of a booklet, which
in part detailed information on five ways to end one's life effectively, was
conduct amounting to aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring suicide
under section 2(1) of the English Suicide Act, 1961. Although the case did
not finally determine the issue of whether or not the booklet's distribution
was lawful (a declaration either way not being granted), Mr. Justice Woolf
attempted to clarify the law. An accomplice under section 2(1) of the Sui-
cide Act, 1961, he held, was a principal offender and so could be held liable
for the offense if suicide was attempted, and, even if no suicide was at-
15. Similar legislation-Refusal of Medical Treatment Bill, 1982-introduced in the Vic-
torian Parliament by a private member failed due to opposition from the Roman Catholic
Church. See generally M. Kirby, Euthanasia-Old Issue.- New Debate, 14 AUSTL. N.Z. J.
MED. 691 (1984); Rayner, Euthanasia, 14 AUSTL. N.Z. J. MED. 697 (1984). Such legislation
is apparently still being considered in Victoria. See Law Reform Commissioner, Victoria,
Murder: Mental Element and Punishment 25 n.44 (Working Paper No. 8, May 1984); Maher,
Euthanasia, 59 L. INST. J. 445 (1985). See also Hickie, Euthanasia 1984, 141 MED. J. AUSTL.
140 (1984); Gerber, Life at Any Price, 141 MED. J. AUSTL. 141 (1984); Saclier, Voluntary
Euthanasia: The Right to Choose, AUSTL. RATIONALIST Q., No. 4, Oct-Dec. 1980, at 13.
16. Suicide Act, 1961, § 1, 9 & 10 ELiz. 2, ch. 60 (U.K.)-for an analysis of this statute,
see generally Downey, Suicide Act, 1961, 25 MODERN L. REV. 60 (1962); Crimes Act, 1958,
§ 6A (Vic.), Crimes Act, 1900, § 31A (N.S.W.); Crimes Act, 1961, §§ 179, 180 (N.Z.).
17. Coroners Act, 1912, § 3(1) (N.S.W.); Coroners Act, 1935, § 26(3) (S.A.); Coroners
Act, 1958, § 46(1) (Qld.); Coroners Act, 1920, § 21(1) (W.A.); Coroners Act, 1957, § 7(5)
(ras).
18. Coroners Act, 1958, § 17 (Vic.).
19. Suicide Act, 1961, § 2(1) (U.K.) (punishment of fourteen years of jail); Crimes Act,
1958, § 6B(2) (Vic.) (fourteen years imprisonment); Crimes Act, 1900, § 31C (N.S.W.). See
also R. v. Croft, [1944] K.B. 295; Lanham, Murder by Instigating Suicide, 1980 CRIM. L. REV.
215. A very valuable survey of the law, although in some respects now obsolete, appears in
Barry, Suicide and the Law, 5 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 1 (1965).
20. [1984] 1 Q.B. 795 (1983).
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tempted, could be convicted of an attempt to commit the section 2(1) of-
fense. For the respondents to be held liable, three requirements had to be
satisfied, namely:
(1) the alleged offender had the necessary intent, intending to as-
sist someone contemplating suicide to attempt suicide;
(2) that the alleged offender distributed the booklet to someone
contemplating suicide with that intention;
(3) that the person attempting suicide "was assisted or en-
couraged" by the booklet to attempt or actually commit
suicide.2 '
The situation in New South Wales is slightly different. Following the
Crimes (Mental Disorder) Amendment Act, 1983, a distinction for punish-
ment is drawn between aiding and abetting22 and inciting or counselling sui-
cide.23 The name of the amending act as relating to "mental disorders" is
curious. However, Glanville Williams writes that of a study of one-hundred
successful suicides, ninety-three percent were caused by mental illness, pri-
marily a depressive condition.24
Another relevant matter is suicide pacts. In England and Victoria a sui-
cide pact is a common agreement between two or more people having for its
object the death of all of them. Where a person acting in pursuance of such
a pact kills the other or is a party to the other being killed by a third person,
he is guilty of manslaughter. 25
In contrast, in New South Wales under section 31B of the Crimes Act,
1900, the survivor of a suicide pact is not guilty of murder or manslaughter,
but may under section 31C be guilty of an offense of aiding, abetting, coun-
selling or inciting suicide.
3. The Code Jurisdictions: Western Australia, Queensland
and Tasmania
In Tasmania there is no such crime as self-murder under section 163 of
the Criminal Code Act, 1924. In Western Australia and Queensland suicide
21. Id. at 812. The ostensible reason for banning assistance in a justified suicide situation
may be the risk of abuse, but the real reason seems to be the prevailing repugnance in the
Western world toward suicide in general. For an appraisal of Able, see Smith, Assisting in
Suicide-The Attorney-General and the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, 1983 CRIM. L. REV.
573.
22. Crimes Act, 1900, § 31C(l) (N.S.W.) (ten years imprisonment).
23. Id. § 31C(2) (five years imprisonment where the offense is attempted or committed).
24. G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 616 n.9 (2d ed. 1983).
25. Suicide Act, 1961, § 3 (U.K.); Crimes Act, 1958, § 6B(I)(Vic.) (survivor of suicide
pact who kills the deceased is guilty of manslaughter); id. § 6B(3) (suicide pact no defense to
murder if accused not party to pact); id. § 6B(4) (meaning of "suicide pact").
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is not treated as a form of murder2 6 as the codes make no specific mention of
it.
In Tasmania, since 1957, attempted suicide has not been a crime. In
Western Australia and Queensland it remains an offense, with punishment
being limited by statute (Western Australia: punishment limited to not more
than one year's gaol, and if the accused admits the offense he may be dealt
with summarily by justices, who may sentence him to no more than six
months imprisonment;27 Queensland: attempted suicide is an offense pun-
ishable by not more than one year's imprisonment2 ).
In all three code jurisdictions, any person who instigates another to kill
himself is guilty of a crime,29 the punishment in Queensland and Western
Australia including hard labor for life3" (consent by a person to the causing
of his own death not diminishing the criminal responsibility of the killer3 1).
In Tasmania, the punishment is such term of imprisonment as the judge
thinks fit.
32
The legal position of Australian jurisdictions is clear. In all states, except
in South Australia, the law does not recognize euthanasia or mercy-killing as
any special form of excusable or nonpunishable homicide, even with the con-
sent of the person concerned. In all states aiding and abetting the death of
another by his own hand is a crime. Producing a cessation of bodily func-
tions, whether or not they are artificially maintained and regardless of
whether the cessation is by positive act or deliberate omission, is a punish-
able homicide.
Therefore, since death in this sense cannot lawfully be contrived by the
deceased or by anyone else in concert with him, there can be no legal right to
die. However, it should be pointed out that mere omission to prolong life or
to make available the means whereby life can be maintained-no matter for
how short a period-unless it entails gross neglect or wilful abstention from
invoking normal measures of skill and assistance,: is not an offense.33 In
South Australia, the situation has been altered with regard to voluntary eu-
26. The reference in section 293 of the Queensland Criminal Code, 1899, and section 170
of the Western Australian Criminal Code, 1913, to "another" indicates that suicide is not
included within its terms. (These and related sections deal with homicide generally.)
27. Western Australian Criminal Code, 1913, § 289.
28. Queensland Criminal Code, 1899, § 312.
29. Criminal Law Consolidation Act, 1935, § 13a(10) (S. Austl.); Queensland Criminal
Code, 1899, § 7; Western Australian Criminal Code, 1913, § 7.
30. Queensland Criminal Code, 1899, § 311; Western Australian Criminal Code, 1913,
§ 288.
31. Queensland Criminal Code, 1899, §§ 284, 300, 301, 302, 303; Western Australian
Criminal Code, 1913, §§ 261, 277, 278, 279, 280.
32. Tasmanian Criminal Code, 1924, §§ 1, 163, 289(3).
33. Else-Mitchell & Nossal, The Right to Die, 4 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE MEDICO-
1986]
140 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 2:131
thanasia in certain circumstances with the enactment of the Natural Death
Act, 1983, mentioned earlier.
III. THE LAW IN ACTION
The law in theory and the law in practice in Australia, as elsewhere, may
be two different things as in many cases the people who administer the law
seem more rational than the law itself. As is evident from many cases in so-
called "mercy killings" police appear reluctant to prosecute, juries to convict
and judges to punish. Some random examples may be noted:
* Louis Repouille chloroformed his thirteen-year old son who
had suffered from Down's syndrome. He was convicted in
New York of second degree manslaughter with a recommenda-
tion of the "utmost clemency" and freed on a suspended sen-
tence of five to ten years.34
* John Noxon, a prosperous Massachusetts lawyer, was con-
victed of electrocuting his six-month old mongoloid son. His
death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment and later
reduced to six years. He was paroled shortly thereafter.35
* On June 20, 1973, in a town in New Jersey, Lester Zygmaniak
shot his twenty-six year old brother in the head with a shotgun,
who had been paralyzed form the neck down in a motorcycle
accident four days prior to the shooting and had repeatedly
pleaded with Lester to kill him. Indicted for murder in the first
degree Zygmaniak was later acquitted on grounds of temporary
insanity. 36
* Otto Werner pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter for suf-
focating his hopelessly crippled arthritic bedridden wife. The
Illinois court found him guilty, but after hearing the testimony
of his children showing the great devotion he had for his wife
and that the killing had been at her request, the court allowed
the guilty plea to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty entered.
He was then found not guilty.37
LEGAL SOCIETY OF NEW SOUTH WALES 1968-1970, at 21, 27-28 (1970); see also Human
Rights Commission, Australia, Human Rights of the Terminally Ill (Report No. 11, 1985).
34. Repouille v. United States, 165 F. 2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947) (summarizing the facts in the
context of determining whether or not Repouille was a person of "good moral character" for
naturalization under the Nationality Act of 1940).
35. Commonwealth v. Noxon, 319 Mass. 495 (1946).
36. State v. Zygamaniak, No. 1197-72 (Super. Ct., Monmouth County, N.J., Oct. 15,
1973). For a discussion of this case, see Note, Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and
Legislative Considerations, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1213-14 (1973); Comment, The Right to
Die, 10 CAL. W. L. REV. 613, 614 (1974).
37. People v. Werner, Crim. No. 58-3636 (Crim. Ct., Cook County, 11. 1958).
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* The Victorian Supreme Court in 1983 in R. v. Larkina" placed
a nurse on a three-year good behavior bond after she pleaded
guilty to a charge of aiding and abetting suicide by administer-
ing a fatal dose of insulin to her lover who had previously at-
tempted suicide and had repeated his desire to die.
* In the Australian Capital Territory, in 1983, the federal Attor-
ney-General, Senator Gareth Evans decided against proceeding
in a case where a woman suffering from a terminal illness who
had expressed the desire to die was killed by her sister.39
* In a Western Australian case, in April 1964, Dr. Maurice Benn
was sentenced to the mandatory death penalty for the mercy-
killing of his mongoloid son. His sentence was soon commuted
to imprisonment with hard labor for ten years. He was released
on parole, in December 1968, having spent his time in prison
doing scholarly research for his own publication. Upon release
he resumed his position in the community and took up his for-
mer University teaching career. It was clear that public sympa-
thy was on his side and the administrators of the law took that
into account4"
Thus, it would appear that public morality seems to be supportive of eu-
thanasia especially in the case of painful incurable illnesses. This is borne
out by a 1982 Australian survey which found that more than half the people
polled approved of euthanasia "under certain circumstances.""'
The medical profession appears to enjoy a high degree of immunity from
criminal prosecution. It is unlikely that charges would be brought against a
physician if he brought a patient's process of dying to a more rapid end
through the administration of drugs ostensibly for the relief of pain, pro-
vided that what he did was consistent with accepted medical standards. In
the few unreported cases where mercy-killers have actually been brought to
trial, the trend in Australia has generally followed what has happened
overseas.
In R. v. Adams42 Mr. Justice Devlin directed the jury that there is no
special defense justifying a doctor's giving drugs which would shorten life,
but continued "[i]f the first purpose of medicine, the restoration of health,
can no longer be achieved, there [is] still much for the doctor to do, and he
[is] entitled to do all that is proper and necessary to relieve pain and suffer-
38. Law Reform Commissioner, Victoria, supra note 15, at 25.
39. Id.
40. Based on conversation with my colleague, Professor George Winterton, of the Law
School of the University of New South Wales.
41. Sydney Morning Herald, Nov. 15, 1982, at 2.
42. Unreported. The case is discussed in Palmer, Dr. Adams' Trial for Murder, 1957
CRIM. L. REV. 365.
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ing even if the measures he [takes] may incidentally shorten life .
This direction was not challenged by the Attorney-General on behalf of the
Crown.
Though there has been no test case in Australia, in situations where a
physician honors a patient's request by facilitating him in some way to com-
mit suicide (for example, by leaving an extra quantity of tablets in the knowl-
edge or with the strong suspicion that they will be used for that purpose), R.
v. Fretwell may perhaps avail the doctor.45 In that case, proof that an
article was knowingly supplied was not held to be conclusive evidence of
intent to aid. However, the more recent case, National Coal Board v. Gam-
ble,4 6 somewhat discredits this decision. It was made clear there that "inten-
tion" on the part of an accomplice is the mens rea required to hold him
guilty of aiding and abetting.
The physician may, however, argue that the pills were given to ease pain
or for sleeping, and invite the jury to believe him. Parry-Jones suggests that
his confidence would not be misplaced. In his study of the period 1961-
1970, he shows that eighty cases of aiding and abetting a suicide were re-
ported to the Director of Public Prosecutions and criminal proceedings were
instituted in twelve of them. In' two cases the suicide was facilitated at the
request of the deceased and penalties were merely probation for three years
and binding over for two years.47 In cases where a patient fails to take care
of himself because he knows that if he does nothing death will come sooner,
the death may be treated as suicide. A doctor who does nothing cannot be
guilty of aiding and abetting, although there are those who argue that a doc-
tor is under an obligation to prevent a patient from adopting a course of
action which would lead to self-destruction. The plea of necessity and the
case of Leigh v. Gladstone48 (which dealt with the forcible feeding of a stub-
born suffragette) are cited in support. However, this case would be unlikely
to be followed in Australia in the above situation, as there is a "general
principle of self-determination" and "the case cannot stand as authority for
the proposition that there exists a duty ... to prevent someone from refusing
food and a fortiori medical treatment."' 49 A 1965 New Zealand case, Smith
43. Id. at 375, paraphrasing Devlin, J.'s summing-up. See also P. DEVLIN, SAMPLES OF
LAWMAKING 94-95 (1962).
44. [1862] Le. & Ca. 161.
45. Kennedy, The Legal Effect of Requests by the Terminally Ill and Aged Not to Receive
Further Treatment from Doctors, 1976 CRiM. L. REv. 217.
46. [1959] 1 Q.B. 11.
47. Parry-Jones, supra note 12.
48. [1909] 26 T.L.R. 139.
49. Kennedy, supra note 45, at 227.
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v. Auckland Hospital Board,5 emphasizes this latter point. There, Mr. Jus-
tice Gresson held that a patient has the "right to decline operative investiga-
tion or treatment however unreasonable or foolish this may appear in the
eyes of his medical advisers."'" If an adult patient has actually forbidden
treatment, and a doctor gives it, he is acting illegally and could be prose-
cuted for assault.
Another type of case which has yet to be tested in Australia is one where
the physician hastens the natural death of a patient by switching off a neces-
sary mechanical aid such as an automatic respirator or an artificial kidney
machine. One argument is that such mechanical aids may be classed as "ex-
traordinary measures" for keeping the patient alive. They may involve pain
and other .inconvenience and the physician is under no duty to continue
treatment that is a burden to the patient. If the patient has indicated that he
wishes the treatment to be discontinued the physician should be absolved of
his duty to continue treatment. No patient is obliged to endure treatment
for ever.
The celebrated New Jersey decision of In re Quinlan,52 which involved a
twenty-two year-old woman in a permanently comatose state, forced people
to look long and seriously at the problem of keeping terminally ill patients
alive by artificial devices (viz., heart-lung machines, pacemakers, defribil-
lators, chronic dialysis, hypothermia, artificial or transplanted organs) in
modem technologically advanced society. In that case, Karen Quinlan was
placed on a respirator when she ceased breathing. When it became clear
that she had no significant chance of ever regaining neurological functions
and returning to cognitive or sapient life, her parents sought discontinuation
of all extraordinary measures including the respirator. It was asserted that
the use of a respirator violated Karen's free exercise of religion, constituted
cruel and unusual punishment, and violated her right of personal privacy.
The court ruled against the parents, arguing that the removal of the respira-
tor would constitute unlawful homicide if it resulted in death. Eventually
after a long court battle, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the first
two claims but agreed that Karen's right of personal privacy encompassed
her freedom to order the withdrawal of extraordinary treatment. It there-
50. 1965 N.Z.L.R. 191.
51. Id. at 219. See also Gerber, Informed Consent, 140 MED. J. AUSTL. 89 (1984);
Gerber, Informed Consent-The Last of Mr Sidaway?, 142 MED. J. AUSTL. 643 (1985).
52. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A. 2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976). The literature on this case is voluminous and evergrowing, prompting many legislative
measures which will no doubt be of great relevance to Australian lawmakers. For a sampling
of such writings, see Symposium, "In re Quinlan," 30 RUTGERS L. J. 243 (1977); Comment,
Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 IND. L. J. 539 (1976).
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fore allowed the respirator to be unhooked. 3 Interestingly, hooked up to a
nasogastric feeding tube and IVs, Karen Quinlan continued to breathe un-
aided until she finally died on June 11, 1985 of pneumonia.
Several factors have been noted relating to the application of the law in
euthanasia cases where a physician is involved. Prosecutors may be reluc-
tant to institute proceedings against a reputable doctor who has acted in
difficult circumstances. Although there is scant hard evidence of the inci-
dence of euthanasia, there can be little doubt that to some extent it is prac-
ticed at least by omission. One factor in the failure to prosecute, or if there is
a prosecution the failure to convict, is the difficulty of proving causation.
Even when causation can be shown, courts and juries are often motivated by
sympathy for the physician's humanitarian motive. 4 These factors are
probably also at work in Australia in relation to the laws on euthanasia as
they are applied in practice.
IV. THE MOVEMENT FOR LEGALIZATION OF EUTHANASIA
A. The Euthanasia Debate
The respective positions of those arguing for and against legalization of
euthanasia, and the arguments advanced by both sides on moral grounds are
clear.
Pro-euthanists argue that denying a compassionate death to terminally ill
persons, suffering excruciating agony, and kept alive only by the "extraordi-
nary"55 techniques of advanced medical science, is desperately inhumane.
Furthermore, they state, it is barbaric to compel the family of a terminal
patient to witness the ever-worsening stages of his ailment, and to watch the
53. The post-Quinlan cases reveal two lines of thinking. First, those that require court
approval before physicians withhold or withdraw life support. See, e.g., Custody of a Minor,
385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68
Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980). And, second, those which do not require judicial in-
volvement, preferring instead that the decision to withhold .or withdraw life support be made
within the patient-physician-family relationship. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp.,
Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); In re Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983),
modified on other grounds, In re Guardianship of Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372
(1984). The majority of cases, however, favor the second approach enunciated by Quinlan.
See generally LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY
ILL PATIENTS (A. Doudera & J. Peters eds. 1982); Ainley, Discontinuing Treatment of Coma-
tose Patients Who Have Not Executed Living Wills, 19 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 61 (1985).
54. Gurney, Is There a Right to Die?-A Study of the Law of Euthanasia, 3 CUM.-SAM. L.
REV. 235, 251 (1972).
55. For a classic description of what constitutes "ordinary" and "extraordinary,"see D.
MEYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING 148 (1981):
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slow, agonizing death of their loved one, degenerating before their eyes, be-
ing transformed from a vital and robust parent or spouse into a pathetic and
humiliated creature, devoid of human dignity. Death should no longer be
viewed as a personal failure, but an orchestrated overture of life and living.
However, as noted, this right to choose death over life has never been recog-
nized by the common law.
Among the major objections to legalizing voluntary euthanasia, generally
advanced by those with a religious perspective, are:
(1) that doctors are already performing sub silentio whatever
mercy killings may be necessary;
(2) that the use of modem pain-relieving drugs and the hospice
movement to help people cope with pain and fear of death
obviates the need for voluntary euthanasia;
(3) that there is risk of mistake in medical diagnosis, and, once
made, the consequences would be irreparable;
(4) that there are possibilities of new medical discoveries to cure
the incurable patient;
(5) that it is difficult to ascertain whether the patient has really
consented;
(6) that legitimizing an act of killing because life is "not worth
living" would undermine respect for life and could open the
door to mass involuntary euthanasia or genocide.
These arguments deserve detailed refutation.
A sufficient answer to the first objection would be: A situation in which
euthanasia is admittedly practiced by the medical profession, while labelled
"homicide" by existing law, must not continue. No amount of Holmesian
realism can persuade a physician that a prosecutor's willingness to look the
Ordinary means are all medicines, treatments, and operations, which offer a rea-
sonable hope of benefit and which can be obtained and used without excessive ex-
pense, pain, or other inconvenience.
Extraordinary means are all medicines, treatments, and operations which cannot
be obtained or used without excessive expense, pain, or other inconvenience; or
which, if used, would not offer a reasonable hope of benefit.
See also D. WALTON, ETHICS OF WITHDRAWAL OF LIFE-SUPPORT SYSTEMS 222-26 (1983);
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 48, 355 A. 2d 647, 667, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey,
429 U.S. 922 (1976); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,
490-91 (1983). The President's Commission Report, however, proposes that the traditional
distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" care should no longer be used to deter-
mine whether or not an individual should accept treatment, for technological advances change
the extraordinary into ordinary. Instead, a useful/burdensome distinction should be adopted.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BI-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING To FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT 83-89 (1983).
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other way may weaken his legal obligations. Although prosecution may be
rare, criminal liability is a serious and unnerving threat.
True, in relation to the second objection, the modem armor of tranquiliz-
ing, euphoric, pain-killing (analgesic) and stupefying (narcotic anaesthetic)
drugs has helped alleviate the agony of painful suffering, but they do not
cure the terminally ill patient. Additionally, there are diseases--e.g., cancer
of the throat, emphysema-for which even modem drugs can offer no pain-
killing effect. There is also the problem of addiction (since increased dosages
are generally necessary to neutralize the pain). And, there are the side-ef-
fects-vomiting, nausea and long periods of consciousness of impending
doom-which may be just as undesirable.
To counter the third objection, the percentage of correct diagnosis is un-
usually high in cancer cases, and wrong diagnosis of patients commonly re-
ferred to as "human vegetables" is practically nonexistent. Any possibility
of an incorrect diagnosis can, however, be rectified by legislation requiring
an euthantee to be examined by several physicians.
The fourth objection overlooks that there exists a substantial time lag be-
tween the initial discovery and reporting of a miraculous new drug or ther-
apy and the availability of the same to the medical profession. Is it
consistent with the object of voluntary euthanasia to demand that the patient
mortgage his dignity to technology and suffer in the interim on the tenuous
proposition that a miraculous cure might be found? Moreover, news of a
relevant medical breakthrough could stop euthanasia in relevant cases.
Concerning thefifth objection, a variety of protective procedural schemes
to forestall some of the vexed problems of assessing the "voluntariness" of
consent have been advanced. This would undoubtedly prevent problematic
termination by those deranged individuals who are either fanatically fasci-
nated by resurrection or are trapped in experiencing transitory deprivations
of life values-illness, divorce, agony, frustration, financial impoverishment,
or failed romance. One safeguard is that if relatives are pushing the sick
person toward euthanasia, the doctor should not oblige. Similarly,
mandatory time intervals allowing a patient greater reflection and interven-
tion of neutral third parties to verify the diagnosis and the patient's consent
could be required. The physician must inform the patient of all facts neces-
sary to his intelligent and "informed" consent. Adequate legislation can fur-
ther provide a patient an opportunity to request voluntary euthanasia while
still in a rational state of mind. Therefore, one of the suggested solutions is
that the individual should indicate to what extent he consents to treatment,
while fully in control of his faculties.
The sixth argument, though appealing to some and reminiscent of the per-
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ils of Nazi Germany, can be countered by explaining that voluntary euthana-
sia will be administered to a patient only upon his freely given, intelligent
and informed consent. In fact, the practice of withholding medical care
from defective newborns is so pervasive that we may have already embarked
on a widespread program of involuntary pediatric euthanasia in Australia:
"[Clompassionate infanticide is already standard practice where the product
of birth is such as to justify the term 'monstrous', i.e., where there is a gross
and physically disgusting malformation such as anencephaly (complete ab-
sence of -brain). Severe spina fida, where there is no possibility of effective
surgery, is also not infrequently dealt with by allowing the infant to die
under sedation.",5 6
B. Australian Initiatives
Unfortunately, however, every doctor in Australia, except perhaps in
South Australia, who presently assists a terminally ill patient to end his life
remains under the threat of criminal sanctions.
The societies working for legalization of euthanasia do not necessarily
want the present law changed so that the burden of termination of life will be
on the physician. They believe that the person desiring death should not
need to involve medical workers beyond the point of assisting him in his own
suicide and that only the person incapable of suicide would need euthanasia.
They argue that physicians should not have to decide on life or death for
their patients-that choice should be the patient's. The Voluntary Euthana-
sia Society of Victoria includes the following in its proposals for legislation:
Under voluntary euthanasia legislation, the doctor's duty is to give
a medical assessment-a diagnosis and prognosis-and to advise
the patient, if he is capable of rational choice, of alternative treat-
ments and the consequences of accepting or rejecting them. The
patient does the deciding with the information given him or, if he
has lost mental competency, by the advance declaration which he
has previously made against just that eventually. 7
After the patient has made his decision about his own fate, then the medi-
cal profession only becomes really involved if the patient requires assistance
to end his life. In the case of an incompetent patient the doctor has the
56. M. BURNET, ENDURANCE OF LIFE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF GENETICS FOR HUMAN
LIFE 96 (1978). Cf. Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides, 7 AM. J. L. & MED. 393
(1982); Australian College of Paediatrics, Nonintervention in Children with Major Handicaps-
Legal and Ethical Issues, 19 AUSTL. PAEDIAT. J. 217 (1983); KUHSE & SINGER, supra note 10.
57. VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA SOCIETY OF VICTORIA, VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA-THE
RIGHT TO CHOOSE 17 (1977).
1986]
148 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 2:131
means of administering painless death in accordance with the patient's previ-
ously expressed wishes.
The possibility of law reform in this area is quite clear. As previously
noted, the South Australian Natural Death Act was passed in 1983 in re-
sponse to these initiatives. In addition, despite the failure of the Refusal of
Medical Treatment Bill in Victoria, there are moves in that state to have the
law relating to "mercy killing" reformed. A Working Paper released by the
Victorian Law Reform Commission as part of a review of the law of homi-
cide generally recognizes three possibilities of reform: that a new offense of
"mercy killing" could be created with a lower penalty than that for murder;
that a compassionate motive could constitute a mitigating circumstance, re-
ducing murder to manslaughter; or punishment for murder could become a
discretionary sentence, to allow a judge to take motive into account in sen-
tencing.5" Whether the proposal relating to the creation of a separate offense
will amount to anything is doubtful. The English Criminal Law Revision
Committee made a similar proposal in 1976, but was forced to withdraw it
because of strong critical response.59 Likewise the South Australian Reform
Committee' and the Canadian Law Reform Commission 6 1 rejected the
need for change, the Canadian Report emphatically recommending that
"mercy killing" not be made a separate offense with special modes for sen-
tencing, 62 although the South Australian Committee stated that "it may be
appropriate to release such a person on parole immediately after sentence."63
C. Overseas Reforms
If Australian law is changed in response to pressure from groups advocat-
ing voluntary euthanasia, although it would not be a "first," it would never-
theless set an important world precedent. Changes to the law have been
made in overseas countries.
Uruguayan law is perhaps the most advanced in that judges are allowed to
forego punishment completely where a defendant whose previous life had
been honorable commits a homicide motivated by compassion and induced
58. Supra note 15, at 25.
59. CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTE, WORKING PAPER ON OFFENCES AGAINST
THE PERSON 31 (1976).
60. CRIMINAL LAW AND PENAL METHODS REFORM COMMITTEE OF SOUTH AUSTRA-
LIA, FOURTH REPORT-THE SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 58 (1977).
61. LAW REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, WORKING PAPER No. 28, EUTHANASIA, AID-
ING SUICIDE AND CESSATION OF TREATMENT (1982); Samek, Euthanasia and Law Reform,
17 OTTAWA L. REV. 86 (1985).
62. Id. at 20.
63. Supra note 60, at 58.
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by repeated requests of the victim.64
Most jurisdictions which have examined the question of euthanasia have
drawn a distinction between voluntary and involuntary killings. The Italian,
Netherlands, Spanish, German, Polish and Japanese Penal Codes all allow a
mitigation in penalty if the killing is carried out at the request of the vic-
tim. 65 The German Penal Code makes specific provision in section 216 that
in the case of "homicide upon the request of the person killed," the punish-
ment is limited to two years, and if extenuating circumstances are present, it
can be reduced to six months."
But involuntary euthanasia has been treated more cautiously. For exam-
ple, the Swiss Penal Code covers the area of voluntary euthanasia, but the
question of involuntary euthanasia is unclear. 67 The Norwegian Penal Code
draws a specific distinction: Section 235 contains a special provision for
mercy-motivated or requested killing of hopelessly ill people, with a 1961
amendment exempting the mercy-killer where the victim consented or was
hopelessly ill from normal homicide provisions. Under section 114, a lesser
degree of punishment (three days to three years) is applicable for homicide
upon the victim's serious and urgent request.68
The situation in the United States is very relevant for Australia, illustrated
by the similarity between the Californian and South Australian Natural
Death Acts. The "right to die" legislation, as it has been termed in the
United States, is in effect an extension of a patient's well-established com-
mon-law right to refuse medical treatment, 69 rather than addressing the is-
64. URUGUAY PENAL CODE art. 37 (1933).
65. See generally Silving, supra note 5; Sayid, Euthanasia: A Comparison of the Criminal
Laws of Germany, Switzerland and the United States, 6 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 533, 547-
55 (1983); Aly & Roth, The Legalization of Mercy Killings in Medical and Nursing Institutions
in Nazi Germany from 1938 Until 1941: A Completed Documentation, 7 INT'L J.L. & PsY-
CHOLOGY 145 (1984).
66. STRAFGESETZBUCH (STGB) [GERMAN PENAL CODE], § 216.
67. SCHWEIZERICHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [Swiss PENAL CODE] ART. 114 (1942).
68. See generally D. MEYERS, THE HUMAN BODY AND THE LAW-A MEDICO-LEGAL
STUDY 152-55 (1970); Silving, supra note 5.
69. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)
(Cardozo, J.): "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body. . . . This is true except in cases of emergency where
the patient is unconscious and where it is necessary to operate before consent can be obtained."
For an examination of various statutes in the United States recognizing the concept of a
"living will," see generally Dufraine, Living Wils--A Need for Statewide Legislation or a Fed-
erally Recognized Right, 3 DET. C.L. REV. 781 (1983); Capron, Death and the Law: A Decade
of Change, 63 SOUNDINGS 290 (1980); Kirby, The Euthanasia-Living Will Debate, in ISSUES
IN ETHICS 45 (Papers Presented at the Monash University Centre for Human Bioethics Con-
ference on Medical Science and Preservation of Life: Ethical and Legal Dilemmas, Nov. 1981)
(1982).
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sue of euthanasia directly. The enactments of the American jurisdictions,7"
and the Natural Death Act of South Australia, give legal effect to a written
document in a prescribed form in which a person states that in the event of
terminal illness, life-prolonging treatment is not to be maintained.
In such statutes, there tend to be two "thresholds"-the disease qualifica-
tion, that the patient must be terminally ill71 which may mean either irre-
versibly dying7 2 or facing imminent death,7 3 and a therapeutic requirement,
namely, that the treatment is "artificial, extraordinary, extreme or radi-
cal."74 Clearly, the American statutes are flexible, leaving to the physician
70. See Flaherty, A Right to Die?, Nat'l L. J., Jan. 14, 1985, at 1, col. 1. Since 1976, the
following states have enacted such "right to die" or "natural death" legislation: Alabama:
Natural Death Act, ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); Arkansas: Death With Dignity
Act, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3804 (Supp. 1983); California: Natural Death Act,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185 to 7195 (West Supp. 1985); Delaware: Death With
Dignity Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501 to 2509 (1983); District of Columbia: Uniform
Determination of Death Act of 1981, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2422 to -2430 (Supp. 1985); Flor-
ida: Life-Prolonging Procedure Act, ch. 84-58, 1984 FLA. LAWS 136; Georgia: GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (Michie Supp. 1984); Idaho: Natural Death Act, IDAHO CODE §§ 39-
4501 to -4508 (Supp. 1984); Illinois: Illinois Living Will Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2
§§ 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85); Kansas: Natural Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 65-28,101 to -28,109 (1980); Louisiana, Natural Death Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:
1299.58.1 - .10 (West Supp. 1985); Mississippi: Act of Apr. 16, 1984, ch. 365, 1984 Miss. LAW
98; Nevada: Withholding or Withdrawal of Life Sustaining Procedures, NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 449.540 to .690 (1983); New Mexico: Right To Die Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11
(Supp. 1984); North Carolina: Right to a Natural Death; Brain Death, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 90-320 to -323 (1981); Oregon: Rights With Respect To Terminal Illness, OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 97.050 to .090 (1983); Texas: Natural Death Act, TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h §§ I to 11
(Vernon Supp. 1985); Vermont: Terminal Care Document, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251 to
5262 (Supp. 1984); Virginia: Natural Death Act of Virginia, VA. CODE § 54-325.8:1 to .8:12
(Supp. 1984); Washington: Natural Death Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to
.122.905 (West Supp. 1983-84); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to 16-30-10 (Michie
Supp. 1984); Wisconsin: Act of Apr. 18, 1984, Act No. 202, 2 Wis. LAWS 1274 (to be codified
at Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to 154.15); Wyoming: Wyo. STAT. §§ 33-26-144 to -26-152
(Michie Supp. 1984). The New York legislature is drafting "right to die" legislation. Joyce,
To Die or Not to Die: The New York Legislature Ponders a Natural Death Act, 13 FORDHAM
URB L. J. 639 (1985). For a survey of natural death legislation, see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, DECIDING To FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 139-42, 309-87, and apps.
D. E (1983).
71. E.g., Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1984).
72. E.g., Natural Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28, 102 (1980); Right To Die Act,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-7-2 (Supp. 1984).
73. E.g., Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1984);
Natural Death Act, IDAHO CODE § 39-4503 (Supp. 1984); Withholding or Withdrawal of Life
Sustaining Procedures, NEV. REV. STAT. § 499.590.610 (1983); Natural Death Act, WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.020 (Supp. 1985); Illinois Living Will Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110 1/2, § 702(f) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85).
74. Death With Dignity Act, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3802 (Michie Supp. 1983).
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the determination of what is an "extraordinary measure" or a "terminal
illness."
In general, the statutes apply only to "competent adults,"T children and
those of unsound mind being excluded. However, some jurisdictions have
made provision for proxy consent. North Carolina's statute allows proxy
consent for an irreversibly comatose patient who has not previously executed
the document, consent being given by a spouse, legal guardian or a majority
of the relatives of the first degree,76 although the provisions make no refer-
ence to any other type of incompetent patient. The Virginia statute does not
expressly allude to the rights of patients with inadequate decisionmaking ca-
pacity and refers only to competent patients.77 In New Mexico, provision is
made for proxy consent for minors,78 although not for incompetent adults.
Arkansas, however, covers both minors and incompetent adults.79
A key feature of almost all natural-death legislation is the immunity it
provides from civil or criminal liability to the physician, medical personnel,
and health care institutions acting in good faith pursuant to the statute and a
validly executed living will. Despite these statutes, however, in both the
United States and Britain, many legislative proposals authorizing euthanasia
in circumstances beyond those in the current statutes (or even at times in
similar circumstances) have been consistently rejected.80 The reasons for re-
jection in such cases are very possibly relevant to Australia.
First is the nonacceptance of the idea of euthanasia by a majority of the
community. Legally, and by conventional standards, euthanasia is murder,
although individuals in particular circumstances may see the matter differ-
ently, and there may be widely felt sympathy for an individual situation.
The community abhors killing as a form of punishment and is unhappy
about it as a means of settling international disputes, so it is understandable
that there should generally be a rejection of the deliberate ending of a life by
75. E.g., Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1984);
Natural Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28, 102 (1980); Withholding or Withdrawal of
Life Sustaining Procedures, NEv. REV. STAT. § 499.590.610 (1983); Natural Death Act,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.020 (Supp. 1985).
76. Right to a Natural Death; Brain Death, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90.322 (1981 and Supp.
1983).
77. Natural Death Act of Virginia, VA. CODE § 54-325.8:1 (Supp. 1984). See generally
Note, Proxy Decisionmaking for the Terminally Ill: The Virginia Approach, 70 VA. L. REV.
1269 (1984).
78. Right To Die Act, N.M. STATE ANN. § 24-7-4 (1981).
79. Death With Dignity Act, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3803 (Michie Supp. 1983).
80. For a review of various criticisms of the concept of "living will," see generally Horan
& Marzen, Death With Dignity and the Living Will: A Commentary on Recent Developments,
5 J. LEGIS. 81 (1978); McCormick & Hellegers, Legislation and the Living Will, 136 AMERICA
210 (1977).
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killing, merciful though its motives may be. Legislators, in their turn, are
sensitive to strongly-held community attitudes.
Secondly, in the main, doctors are undeniably wary of measures to legalize
euthanasia. Their traditional role has been to safeguard life (the time-
honored Hippocratic Oath obligates the medical profession to preserve life
wherever possible, and to "give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor
suggest any such counsel"81), while at the same time they accept not only
the responsibility of saving their patients from avoidable suffering but also
the fact that to do this may hasten an inevitable death.82
But to be a legal public executioner is another matter. If euthanasia is
legal-and if doctor, patient and relatives know it-intolerable situations
could arise. The doctor will in certain circumstances feel obliged to consider
the possibility of euthanasia and may be aware of pressure in that direction
from relatives, either on the patient or on himself. He will have the responsi-
bility of choosing to reject the idea and being accused of allowing suffering
which he could have prevented in a simple quick way. On the other hand,
he will be able to bring about death deliberately and then wonder whether he
was wrong. It is understandable that doctors prefer not to be faced with
these new and difficult situations.
One further reason for consistent rejection of legislation would appear to
be the fact that the situations envisaged in such legislation-delicate human
situations, mostly with deep emotional overtones-seem not to lend them-
selves easily to cold legal provisions. Even some supporters of the intentions
of the bills proposed in the United States and Britain have been critical of
the proposed legal wording.
Other arguments against euthanasia, foreshadowed earlier, are: the com-
monly cited "thin edge of the wedge" argument which considers that the
likely consequence for the individual and society of any move in the direc-
tion of allowing killing would be sooner or later to put all life in jeopardy;
and the argument that voluntary euthanasia legislation would undermine a
patient's confidence in his doctor. Patients are now secure in the knowledge
that their doctors will not kill them. A further argument rests on the fallibil-
ity of medicine, doctor and patient, and the idea that some diseases regress
spontaneously, cures are sometimes discovered, and some doctors make
wrong diagnoses. No doubt all of these arguments weigh with legislators
when they are considering whether or not to legalize euthanasia.
81. Hippocratic Oath. See H. JACOBS, THE SPECTRE OF MALPRACTICE 416-17 (1978);
for the Australian practice, see A. BURTON, MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW 11-14 (3d ed.
1979).
82. See Wanzer et al., The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310
NEW ENG. J. MED. 955 (1984).
Euthanasia
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is now increasingly realized that "voluntary euthanasia will only be le-
galized when it is felt that the advantages it offers outweigh the abuses to
which it might be subject and the negative results it might have." 3 Until
law reform ensures that an incurably ill patient may have his life ended at a
time of his own choosing, the most he can legally seek from his doctors in
Australia is adequate relief of distress and the nonuse of excessive means of
life-support. An Advance Declaration completed and signed by the person
making it and witnessed by two nonrelatives is designed to seek this, stating:
If there is no reasonable prospect of my recovery from physical or
mental illness or impairment expected to cause me severe distress
or to render me incapable of rational existence, I request that I be
allowed to die and not be kept alive by artificial means, and that I
receive whatever quantity of drugs may be required to keep me free
from pain or distress even if the moment of death is hastened.
This is not legally binding on the doctor, but it does free him from any
doubt about the patient's wishes, although he is not obliged to carry them
out.84 Other similar documents designed for use under existing law are the
Memorandum of Wishes and Living Wills such as proposed in the United
States and South Australia. The patient can also be made aware of his pres-
ent legal rights in Australia when dealing with health care officials.
It must be clearly recognized, however, that proponents of euthanasia
freely acknowledge that law reform on its own would not be sufficient to
bring about an ideal situation for the dying. Among other necessary im-
provements are better training in the handling of the dying, better techniques
for controlling pain, and better communication between the dying and their
relatives, and between the dying and the medical staff caring for them. Only
with these improvements, coupled with changes in the law, will the good life
include the right to a good death. "And why not death rather than living
torment?" 5
83. D. MEYERS, supra note 68, at 157; Kuhse, Euthanasia-Again: "Letting Die" is Not
in the Patient's Best Interests" A Case for Active Euthanasia, 142 MED. J. AusTL. 610 (1985);
see also 143 MED. J. AUsTL. 48, 170-71 (1985) (correspondence on Kuhse's views).
84. Under section 4(3) of the South Australian Natural Death Act, 1983, a medical prac-
titioner has a duty to act in accordance with such a declaration. However, under section 5(3),
a medical practitioner incurs no liability for a decision made by him in good faith in regard to
the question of whether a patient is or is not mentally competent at the time of making the
declaration, suffering a terminal illness or had an intention to revoke his direction. However,
section 6(2) makes it clear the statute does not release a physician from the consequences of a
negligent diagnosis as to whether the patient is suffering a terminal illness.
85. W. SHAKESPEARE, THE Two GENTLEMEN OF VERONA, Act III, scene 1, line 170
(Valentine ed.).
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